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A Public International Law Approach to Safeguard Nationality for 
Surrogate Born Children  
Dr Bríd Ní Ghráinne* and Dr Aisling McMahon** 
 
1. Introduction 
International surrogacy agreements pose complex challenges for the states involved. These 
include the question of what should be the nationality of children born following international 
surrogacy agreements (hereafter‘international surrogate children’), which this article focuses 
upon. Take the example of a child born to a surrogate in state A, whose intended parent(s) are 
from state B - how is the nationality of such a child determined?1 As this article explains, this 
question is often tied to who states A and B recognise as the legal parent(s). However, questions 
of nationality of international surrogate children, are complicated by: (i) differences in domestic 
provisions governing the legal parenthood of children; (ii) the absence of any overarching 
international framework in terms of legal parenthood; and (iii) disparities between national 
states on the legality of surrogacy and in particular, the legality of commercial surrogacy. 
Moreover, complications are exacerbated where more than two states are involved; for instance 
if the intended parent(s) are nationals of state C but reside in state D and propose to return and 
                                                          
* BCL (Int) (NUI); LLM (Leiden); DPhil (Oxford). 
** BCL (NUI); LLM (NUI), PhD (Edinburgh). The authors would like to thank Professor Tamara Hervey and 
Dr James Upcher for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this piece. All errors and omissions remain 
the authors’ own. 
1 Commissioning parent(s) refers to the person(s) who have asked the surrogate to carry a child for them, with 
the intention that the child will be handed over after birth to their care and will be raised by the commissioning 
parent(s).  
2 
 
raise the child in state D; or where a donor egg and/or donor sperm from a national of another 
state is used in the creation of an embryo which is then implanted in the surrogate. The second 
scenario can pose difficulties in states where nationality or legal parenthood is tied to biological 
links as this means that the child may have no biological link with the intended  parent(s), and 
instead have a biological link with a third party national.  
Furthermore, given that many rights and responsibilities flow from the state to its nationals and 
this entails an economic burden for the state, states are often reluctant to recognise international 
surrogate children as their nationals. As a consequence, international surrogate children can be 
rendered stateless, that is persons‘who [are] not considered as a national by any state under the 
operation of its law.’2 The stateless person has been referred to as ‘flotsam, a res nullius,’ and 
has been compared to ‘a vessel on the open sea, not sailing under any flag.’3 This is because 
nationality entitles individuals to the diplomatic protection of a state and since many civil, 
political, and social rights (eg. the right to vote, and the rights to education, medical care etc.) 
are directly linked to one’s nationality, children born stateless are denied such protections and 
fundamental rights.4. Being born stateless creates significant problems immediately from birth, 
such as the inability to receive a passport, and imposing a continued status of statelessness on 
anyone, especially a child, is entirely unsatisfactory. It amounts to a failure in fundamental 
rights protection for such children, as their human rights often cannot be vindicated because 
their rights are not opposable to any particular state. Furthermore, nationality has been 
                                                          
2 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 360 UNTS 117, Article 1(1). 
3 Paul Weis, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961’ (1962) 11(4) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1073. 
4 Paul Weis, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961’ (1962) 11(4) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1073. 
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conceived of as part of one’s identity which falls under one’s right to a private and family life,5 
which is also flouted in such cases.  
This article illustrates the relatively untapped potential of Public International Law to determine 
which state, if any, has the obligation to grant nationality to international surrogate children 
who would otherwise be stateless. This examination contributes to the existing debate on 
international surrogacy agreements and statelessness by taking two novel approaches. First, this 
article examines international surrogacy agreements through a deliberately pragmatic 
perspective taking as its starting point the reality that international surrogacy agreements are 
occurring globally and increasing in rate, and that regardless of the ethical issues surrounding 
such agreements, all children have the right to a nationality. Consequently, an examination of 
the ethical questions which surround the existence and operation of international surrogacy 
arrangements is beyond the scope of this article, aside from a brief reference to put this 
discussion in context. Second, this article represents the first legal analysis of nationality and 
international surrogacy agreements through a Public International Law lens. Much of the 
literature surrounding international surrogacy agreements has focused on the Private 
International issues which for the reasons outlined in part 5, is not necessarily the best or indeed 
the only way to provide protection to international surrogate children. We encourage persons 
petitioning on behalf of stateless children to advance the arguments rooted in Public 
International Law contained in this article, as such arguments tend not to be made at present.  
This article also contributes to debates surrounding transnational/international reproductive 
services. Surrogacy represents a useful case-study for exploring the challenges relating to the 
governance of transnational reproductive ‘tourism’ where individuals trying to evade 
restrictions in their state of origin - or high costs - travel to states with more permissive 
                                                          
5 Mennesson v France, application no. 65192/11, 26 June 2014; Labassee v France, application no. 65941/11, 26 
June 2014 
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regulatory frameworks. The desirability of surrogacy arrangements is contested. The main 
objections include claims that it leads to exploitation;6 that free consent is impossible to obtain;7 
and that it involves the commodification of children.8 On the contrary, others argue that 
surrogacy empowers women to support themselves; and/or that it supports the 
recognition/creation of differing family forms particularly same-sex or single parent families.9 
Accordingly, a fragmented patchwork of differing national regulatory responses is evident. 
Moreover, states with laws restricting surrogacy are often reluctant to recognise international 
agreements.10 More generally, many states only recognise legal parentage, subject to specific 
conditions, eg. only for heterosexual married intended parents; or if there is a biological 
connection between the intended parent(s) and child, leading to ‘fragmentation of parentage 
into genetic, gestational, and intentional components’.11 We argue that the human rights of the 
child must prevail and must be prioritised over national public policy concerns seeking to 
prohibit/limit surrogacy. More broadly, this research contributes to the debates concerning areas 
where the law has difficulty accommodating rapid developments in technology.12 In particular, 
                                                          
6 See Sonia Allan, ‘The Surrogate in Commercial Surrogacy’ in Paula Greber and Katie O’Byrne (eds) 
Surrogacy, law and Human Rights (Ashgate, 2015) 
7 Ibid 126-130. 
8 Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artifical Wombs 
(Harper and Row, 1985) 219; Janice G Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle 
over Women’s Freedom (HarperCollins, 1993), 57. 
9 Majorie Maquire Shultz, ‘Reproductive Technology and Intent Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender 
Neutrality’ (1990) Wisconsin Law Review 297; John A Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New 
Reproductive Technologies (Princeton University Press 1994) 131 
10 Anita Stumcke, ‘Extra-Territoriality and Surrogacy: the Problem of State and Territory Moral Sovereignty’ in 
Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds), Surrogacy Law and Human Rights (Ashgate, 2015) 
11Richard F Sturrow, ‘Surrogacy: American Style’ in Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds), Surrogacy Law and 
Human Rights (Ashgate, 2015)  209. 
12 See, for example, Major Arie J Schaap ‘Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use under International 
Law’ (2009) 64(1) Air Force Law Review 121; Bin Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 
‘Instant’ International Customary Law?’ (1965) 5 Indian Journal of International Law 23; Molly McNab and 
Megan Matthews, ‘Clarifying the Law Relating to Unmanned Drones and the Use of Force: The Relationships 
Between Human Rights, Self-Defense, Armed Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law’ (2011) 39(4) 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 661; David P. Fidler, ‘SARS and International Law’, (2003) 
8(7) ASIL Insights, available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/7/sars-and-international-law (last 
accessed 18 February 2016). 
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this article’s purposive approach to treaty interpretation could by analogy inform interpretations 
of the law pertaining to cyberwarfare, disease control, outer space, and the use of drones.   
Part 2 of this article commences by outlining the scope of the problem. It provides an overview 
of the current context of international surrogacy agreements, how statelessness occurs and how 
domestic courts have dealt with such issues. In light of the problems identified with being born 
stateless as discussed in part 3, part 4 of this article argues that, although there are some legal 
provisions that regulate this area – such as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights – protection gaps 
nonetheless remain. The proposed Surrogacy Convention by the Hague Conference on 
International Law seeks to address these gaps. However, the drafters of this Convention are 
likely to encounter significant difficulties, with the result that it is likely to take years if not 
decades to finalise this Convention and it is unlikely to be ratified by those states that prohibit 
surrogacy arrangements. As a result, we argue that the ratification and implementation in 
domestic law of existing Public International Law conventions providing protection for 
stateless children should be given priority, as this approach offers the most meaningful solution 
for such children in the short term. Moreover, these existing protections should be used to 
inform any future protections for surrogate children against statelessness under the proposed 
Convention. 
 
2. International Surrogacy Agreements: The Current Landscape  
Surrogacy involves a scenario where a woman (the surrogate) agrees to become pregnant and 
carry a child for another couple or individual, the intended parent(s) with the intention that after 
birth this child is given to the intended parent(s) to raise. This is achieved either by artificial 
insemination - traditional surrogacy - where the surrogate is inseminated with donor/intended 
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parent’s sperm and she has a biological link with the child; or gestational surrogacy where IVF 
is used to implant an embryo created using the intended parent(s) gametes/and/or donor gametes 
in the surrogacy who will not have a biological link with the child. This highlights the 
differences in genetic links amongst the surrogate/intended parent(s) and the child, which may 
arise in the context of surrogacy agreements. This biological relationship may be relevant in the 
context of a discussion of statelessness, as some states factor this into the consideration of legal 
parenthood and/or nationality.  
There is no international legal framework applicable to surrogacy, and the national regulatory 
responses also differ. Generally states will fall into one of the following four broad categories: 
(i) the practice is unregulated, which means that it operates in a legal vacuum; (ii) states adopt 
a permissive approach where surrogacy is legal but unenforceable, and distinctions may be 
drawn between the legality of commercial and altruistic surrogacy;13 (iii) states adopt a 
permissive approach where contracts are enforceable (again, a distinction may be drawn 
between commercial and altruistic surrogacy); (iv) all forms of surrogacy are prohibited. These 
differing approaches are relevant in the context of nationality questions, as statelessness may 
arise for international surrogate children for two main reasons: (i) due to conflict of laws 
relating to questions of nationality and parenthood, where different approaches apply in the 
state where the child is born and the state of which the intended parent(s) is/are (a) national/s 
of, or to which s/he/they wish(es) to return, leading to difficulties in establishing the nationality 
of the child; and (ii) if international surrogacy agreements are illegal in the intended parent(s) 
state, that state may be reluctant to recognise the legal effects of surrogacy carried out abroad - 
                                                          
13 In some jurisdictions altruistic surrogacy is legal but commercial surrogacy prohibited. 
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and thus the link between the intended parent(s) and the child – and therefore it is difficult to 
establish nationality.14 
Notwithstanding the dearth of international guidance on this area, the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (‘HCCH’) has recognised that international surrogacy agreements are 
growing at a rapid pace.15 Whilst the HCCH acknowledged the difficulties surrounding accurate 
reporting of international surrogacy agreements,16 it highlighted there was evidence from a 
study by Aberdeen University of a ‘tremendous growth in the “market”’ with an increase of 
nearly 1,000% in the number of documented arrangements when it examined data from five 
agencies specialising in international surrogacy from 2006-2010.17  
International surrogacy is also an area which is global in reach, with intended 
couples/individuals travelling from all regions of the world. The range of states to which such 
couples/individuals travel for international surrogacy agreements is diverse, although the more 
popular regions for couples/individuals to travel to are North America, Eastern Europe, and 
Asia.18 Having said this, there have been recent changes to the laws in states, including Thailand 
and India19 - previously popular ‘destination’ states for international surrogacy- which now ban 
                                                          
14 See generally, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Permanent Bureau, ‘Private International Issues 
surrounding the Status of Children, including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements’ (2011) 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf   
15 Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Preliminary Report on Issues arising from International 
Surrogacy (March 2012), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012pd10en.pdf, para. 2 . It has also 
been recognised that surrogacy is increasing within the EU, see EU Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, A 
comparative study on the regime of surrogacy in EU Member States (2013) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474403/IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf, 
para. 5.1. 
16 Ibid, para 6. 
17 Ibid, para 6. 
18 More than two states may be involved, as noted, e.g. if donor gamete(s) from a third jurisdiction is used. Ibid, 
para 6. 
19 See, Government of India Ministry for Home Affairs, Circular No 462 Foreign Nationals including  Overseas 
Citizens of India  (OCI) cardholders] seeking to visit India for commissioning surrogacy (3rd November, 2015) 
which directed that India Missions/Posts/FRROs/FROs to ensure no visas would be issued to foreign nationals or 
permissions granted to OCIs to commission surrogacy in India. It also directed that no exit permission be given to 
children born through surrogacy in India to foreign nationals including OCI cardholders. However, the cases of 
children born through surrogacy already commissioned before the circular was issued exit permission would be 
decided on a case by case basis by FRROs/FROs.. This information is the based on the position at the time of 
writing 21st June, 2016. 
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foreigners availing of surrogacy services in these states. Instead of halting the practice of 
overseas surrogacy, such agreements may be driven underground,20 and should foreign intended 
parent(s) continue to obtain surrogacy services in India/Thailand ignoring these rules, this will 
create further difficulties in terms of nationality for any children born who would be unable to 
leave the jurisdiction. These developments are most likely to result in overseas couples going 
to other more liberal or less regulated jurisdictions for surrogacy services. Indeed, it has been 
reported, that since these changes, surrogacy has been increasing in Cambodia.21 In effect, the 
problems for nationality/statelessness in international surrogacy agreements are merely moved, 
becoming issues involving different jurisdictions than before. 
 
3. International Surrogacy Agreements and the Potential for Statelessness  
Two principles are crucial in terms of determining the nationality of a child at birth, namely:  
jus soli; and jus sanguinis. Under jus soli or ‘the right of the soil’, children acquire the 
nationality of the territory in which they are born. Some states may also adopt limited or 
conditional jus soli provisions, for instance based on a residency period.22 On the other hand, 
jus sanguinis, meaning ‘right of the blood’, is where nationality is not determined by birth but 
by having parents or ancestors who are nationals of that state. If the state where the child is 
born operates under an absolute jus soli principle the child will be a national of that state once 
born, and so will not be stateless. However, if the state where the child is born operates a jus 
sanguinis approach then the child’s nationality is precarious, and will be dependent on who is 
                                                          
Nepal introduced a similar ban on surrogacy which included a ban for foreign nationals or arrangements initiated 
outside Nepal, on 18th September 2015, see http://nepal.usembassy.gov/service/surrogacy-in-nepal.html  
20 It has been argued that a global ban on commercial surrogacy would likely result in a black market for 
surrogacy which could increase the potential for exploitation. See K Trimmings and P Beaumont, International 
Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013), 442. 
21 Michael Cook, ‘Surrogacy Buisness shifts to Cambodia’ Bioedge (7th November, 2015); Vandy Muong and 
Will Jackson, ‘Three Million Dollar Babies’, Phnom Penh Post (2nd January, 2016). 
22 See, Charlene Becker, ‘Jus Soli: A miraculous solution to prevent statelessness?’(9th April, 2015) available at  
http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/jus-soli-miraculous-solution-prevent-statelessness  
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recognised as a ‘parent’. Problems arise if the state of the intended parents, state B, operates 
under jus sanguinis but differs in its rules in terms of how parentage is decided by state A.23 
For instance, if a child is born in state A which recognises the intended parents, who are from 
state B, as the legal parents, state A will consider that the child should be a national of state B. 
However, if state B views the surrogate and her husband as the legal parents, it will consider 
the child a national of state A. As neither state’s law can be imposed on the other, the result is 
that a child born through surrogacy in state A could be left stranded in state A with uncertain 
legal parentage,24 and without nationality of either jurisdiction i.e. stateless. Difficulties may 
also arise if the state in which the child is born operates a conditional jus soli framework 
including residency requirements which a newborn child by definition would not meet. 
The difficulties which arise because of conflicting legal frameworks for parenthood are 
illustrated by the 2008 case of Re: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) before the High Court of England 
and Wales.25 This involved British intended parents who entered into an international surrogacy 
agreement with a married Ukrainian woman. The surrogate was implanted with an embryo 
created using donor eggs and the intended father’s sperm and gave birth to twins. The agreement 
remained amicable however, in the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 
provides that the surrogate is always considered the legal mother of the child.26 Moreover as 
the Ukrainian surrogate was married, under the HFEA her husband, having known and 
consented to the treatment was presumed to be the legal father of the child.27 This is despite the 
                                                          
23 Glenn L. Cohen, Patients with Passports, Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2014), 
403. 
24 Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), Private International Law Issues surrounding the 
Status of children, including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements (March, 2011), 9 Available 
at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf  
25 [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam). 
26 Section 33 HFEA 2008, For discussion, see UK Visas and Immigration, Surrogacy, (June, 2010) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/258243/surrogacy.pdf. For the 
definition of parent for nationality purposes, see British Nationality (Proof of Paternity) Regulations 2006; See 
generally, UK Border Agency, Inter-country surrogacy and Immigration Rules, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261435/Intercountry-surrogacy-
leaflet.pdf , para 34. 
27 S. 28 HFEA, 1990; s. 38  HFEA 2008. 
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fact that the intended father was the children’s biological father.28 However, in the Ukraine, the 
intended parents were seen as the children’s legal parents. As Hedley J. noted, ‘the children had 
no rights of residence in or nationality of the Ukraine and there was no obligation owed them 
by the state other than to accommodate them as an act of basic humanity in a state orphanage’.29 
Instead, the children were ‘marooned stateless and parentless whilst the applicants could neither 
remain in the Ukraine nor bring the children home.’30  
Nonetheless, a temporary solution was found. Following the submission of DNA evidence 
proving that the intended father was the biological parent of the children, discretionary leave 
was provided for the children to enter the UK. This was aimed at allowing the children’s status 
to be regularised by applying for a parental order which would make the intended parents their 
legal parents,31 as a result of which they could then seek UK nationality for the children under 
the British Nationality Act 1981.32 The parental order which was the subject of these 
proceedings was subsequently granted.  
The case of Baby Manji involved an Indian surrogate and Japanese intended parents. An embryo 
was created using the intended father’s sperm and an anonymous donor’s egg, which was 
implanted in the surrogate resulting in the birth of a baby girl. However, the intended parents’ 
relationship broke down and the intended mother refused to participate in the surrogacy 
agreement.33 When the child was born, the intended father sought to bring the child to Japan, 
but his application for a Japanese passport for the child  was unsuccessful as under Japanese 
                                                          
28 [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), para 5-6. 
29 Ibid, para 8. 
30 Ibid, para 10 
31S. 54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. This allows for the transfer of legal parentage in cases of 
surrogacy subject to a number of conditions in the UK context, and avoids couples having to apply to adopt a child 
which was happening previously.  
32 S. 1(5) British Nationality Act 1981. Since 2010,  if a parental order is granted a surrogate child automatically 
becomes a British national, but this would not have been automatic at the time of the case. 
33 Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the 
International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013), 508. 
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law nationality was determined on the basis of the nationality of the birth mother i.e. here, the 
surrogate who was Indian.34 His application for adoption was also unsuccessful, as Indian law 
at the time prohibited the adoption of a female child by a single man. He then applied for an 
Indian passport for the baby. In order to obtain this, a birth certificate was required, and whilst 
under Indian law the intended father could be named on the certificate, it was unclear who the 
legal mother was, namely, whether it was the surrogate or the intended mother, who did not 
wish to be part of the arrangement. Therefore, the birth certificate was refused.  
Eventually, the Indian passport office issued an identity certificate, a legal document issued to 
those who cannot get a passport in their discretionary solution, valid only for the baby to travel 
to Japan. Subsequently, the child was issued with a Japanese visa on humanitarian grounds, on 
which again no reference was made to the child’s nationality. Once the child was in Japan, the 
Japanese authorities agreed that the baby could become a Japanese citizen subject to proof of 
the parent-child relationship.  
As can be seen, the diplomatic and/or discretionary ‘solutions’ adopted to resolve these cases 
are fraught with uncertainties for intended parents and surrogate-born children. They are also 
often ad hoc in nature, can take considerable time to arrange, can be expensive, and can require 
the intended parents to stay for a considerable period of time in state A with the child(ren). 
Moreover, these are often temporary solutions provided to allow the child to travel to state B 
with the intended parents, but (most importantly for the purposes of this article) they do not 
necessarily resolve the nationality status of the child, which may involve further processes after 
the child is in state B. These ‘solutions’ are also of little practical benefit to children abandoned 
by intended parents following an international surrogacy agreement who are left in a highly 
precarious position under this current framework, as in many cases the temporary solutions 
                                                          
34 Charles Kindregan and Danielle White, ‘International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless children in 
cross-border commercial surrogacy arrangements’ (2013) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 527-626, 548. 
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described must be petitioned for through the legal system in either/both states. Without the 
intended parent(s) involved, it is questionable who will apply for such rights on behalf of the 
surrogate child. Moreover, even if the child has a surrogate willing to petition on his/her behalf, 
the reality is the surrogate may not have the resources or means to access the legal services 
necessary to do so.35 Furthermore, as it is the child’s nationality which is in issue in such cases, 
there is no recognisable state which will step in for their protection.  
For these reasons, we argue that the current framework surrounding the nationality of surrogate 
children does not sufficiently safeguard children against statelessness. Recourse to Public 
International Law is warranted as, although it has its limitations, it nonetheless goes some way 
to safeguard human rights for such children.  
 
4. International Protection of Stateless Children born under International Surrogacy 
Agreements 
The literature on International Surrogacy Agreements has taken a Private International Law 
approach,36 which implies complete state sovereignty over nationality. The key argument we 
are making is that existing provisions of Public International Law offer protection to children 
born stateless as a result of international surrogacy agreements. In becoming parties to particular 
treaties, states have consented to be bound to certain provisions that limit their powers in 
determining nationality. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:  
                                                          
35 There will be exceptions to this, such as the case of Baby Gammy whose Thai surrogate decided to raise him 
after the commissioning parents refused to. Subsequently, she successfully petitioned - amidst much 
international media coverage - on behalf of the child for Australian citizenship See, Baby Gammy Granted 
Australian Citizenship, (BBC News, 20th January 2015) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-30892258.   
36 Yasmine Ergas, ‘Babies without Borders: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and the Regulation of International 
Commercial Surrogacy’ (2013) 27 Emory International Law Review 117; Katarina Trimmings and Paul 
Beaumount, ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An urgent need for Legal Regulation at the International 
Level’ 7 Journal of Private International Law 627; Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumount (eds.) International 
Surrogacy Agreements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
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‘The classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by 
the state to its subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is today 
perceived as involving the jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights issues.’37  
The default position in international law is that it is the sovereign right of every state to 
determine under its own laws who are its nationals.38 Thus children born as a result of 
international surrogacy agreements do not have a de facto right of nationality vis a vis the state 
in which they were born. This position is a result of the traditional reluctance of the international 
community to find practical solutions to the problem of statelessness. However, since World 
War I there have been developments in the prevention of statelessness and in the protection of 
stateless persons. These developments are not specific to the context of international surrogacy 
agreements as surrogacy as a practice was not in existence until relatively recently.  
The first international instrument referring to the problem of statelessness was the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).39 Article 15 proclaims that ‘[e]veryone has 
the right to a nationality’ and that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’. 
However, this Article does not identify which state is obliged to grant nationality, nor under 
what circumstances nationality should be granted. More importantly, the UDHR, as a General 
Assembly resolution, is not ipso facto legally binding. Thus Article 15, while an indication of 
political will in this respect, does little in practical terms to combat the problem of 
statelessness.40  
                                                          
37 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion 
OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), [32]-[35]. 
38 Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4. See also the 1930 Hague 
Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 179 LNTS 89; Article 1 provides that 
‘it is for each state to determine under its own laws who are its nationals. This shall be recognised by other states 
in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of international 
law generally recognised with regard to nationality.’ 
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
40 See Paul Weiss, ‘UN Convention on Statelessness, 1961’ (1962) 11 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1074, 1074 - 1075. An argument could be made that Article 15 is part of Customary International Law. 
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However, an attempt was made to find solutions to the problem of statelessness in 1961 when 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS) was completed.41 Article 1 sets out the 
primary rule, which is that a Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its 
territory who would otherwise be stateless. Article 1(a) and (b) sets out that such nationality 
shall be granted: ‘(a) At birth, by operation of law, or; (b) Upon an application being lodged 
with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the person concerned, in the manner 
prescribed by the national law.’ This provision seems quite straightforward in the context of the 
problem identified – a child born as a result of an international surrogacy agreement in a 
Contracting State is entitled to the nationality of that state, if s/he would otherwise be stateless 
(that is, if s/he does not receive nationality on the basis of the jus soli or jus sanguinis principles 
as outlined above).  
Nonetheless, the provision suffers from significant procedural hurdles. Article 1 may be subject 
to the condition that  the child has been habitually resident in the Contracting State for such 
period as may be fixed by that state, not exceeding five years immediately preceding the lodging 
of the application nor ten years in total.42 Unless a state adopts a zero days residency period, a 
child who has just been born will not fulfil residency requirements where such requirements 
are applicable, and thus not be entitled to nationality of the state in which he or she was born. 
For those children, Article 4 provides a ‘safety net’ in the sense that he or she would be entitled 
to the nationality of one of his parents, provided one of his parents was from a Contracting 
State. This, once again, may be subject to a residency period of up to three years preceding the 
lodging of the application for nationality. However, a further significant problem that may arise 
                                                          
For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has referred to article 15 of the UDHR as supporting its 
conclusion that ‘[t]he right of every human being to a nationality has been recognized as such by international 
law.’ See Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory 
Opinion OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), [33]. 
41 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175. 
42 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175, Article 2(b). 
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is where the parent(s) of the child do not lodge an application for nationality.43 This could 
happen where the parent(s) decide they no longer want to raise the child. In such a case, it is 
unclear whether the child would remain stateless and much would depend on who was to 
become the guardian of the child. 
Thus the general position under the CRS is that a child will be given the nationality of the state 
in which s/he was born unless the child does not fulfil residency requirements set out by that 
state (where applicable), in which case the child will be entitled to the nationality of one of 
his/her parents. The exhaustive nature of the list of possible requirements means that states 
cannot establish conditions for the grant of nationality additional to those stipulated in the CRS. 
However, problems remain. First, similar to the issues raised in the first half of this article 
(where it was noted that difficulties in terms of nationality often revolve around the definition 
of parentage for this purpose), the meaning of ‘parent’ under the CRS is also unclear: does it 
mean the biological parent or birth mother? At the time of the CRS’ drafting in 1961 - before 
the advent of assisted reproductive technologies - the birth mother and biological parent were 
synonymous concepts,44 so it is unclear whether the CRS can accommodate children born by 
surrogacy. However, we argue that a modern-day understanding of the term ‘parent’ could be 
applied, in line with the object and purpose of the treaty,45 which is to reduce statelessness,46 
and the evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation, which provides that the meaning of a 
term in a treaty is capable of changing over time.47 
                                                          
43 The meaning of ‘parent’ is discussed below. 
44 The first baby born via in vitro fertilisation was Louise Brown, born in 1978, see Adam Eley, ‘How has IVF 
developed since the first “test-tube baby”’? BBC News (23rd July, 2015) available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-33599353  
45 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Article 31(1). 
46 Preamble, 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175. The preamble forms part of the 
Convention’s context, in accordance with 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 
Article 31(2). 
47 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 
p. 213 [64]. 
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The second, and arguably most significant, problem is that only states that have consented to 
be bound to the CRS are indeed bound by it. At the time of writing, the CRS has only 65 States 
Parties of the 193 or so states in the world. Thus the above-mentioned legal framework set out 
by the CRS is not applicable in most states - including India, Cambodia, the USA, and Thailand, 
states in which a significant amount of children have been born as a result of international 
surrogacy agreements.48 This lacuna of non-participation is anticipated by the CRS in Article 
4, which provides that a Contracting State will grant its nationality to a person born in the 
territory of a non-Contracting State, if the nationality of one of that child’s parents was of that 
Contracting State. Putting aside the definitional issues surrounding who is deemed a ‘parent’, 
further questions are raised by Article 4. What if the child is born in a non-Contracting State, 
and both of that child’s intended parents are from a non-Contracting State? This is the most 
likely scenario, as the majority of states in the world are indeed non-Contracting states.49 In 
such a scenario, the CRS would have no applicability whatsoever and the child would be 
rendered stateless. Thus the problem identified in the first half of this article is not necessarily 
solved by application of the CRS. 
Even if the CRS were applicable, problems still arise in terms of enforcement. Although 
individuals may enforce their rights under the CRS at a domestic level by virtue of the relevant 
legislation which incorporates the CRS rights into domestic law, there is little, if any, recourse 
on the international level for those who feel the CRS has not been applied correctly, or has not 
been applied at all. This is due to a general lack of standing of individuals in the international 
judicial system, and due to the fact that the CRS does not provide for an individual complaint 
mechanism. Generally speaking, states are often reluctant or unable to hold other states 
                                                          
48 Ukraine is party to the Convention as of 25 March 2013. It is unclear whether the amount of International 
Surrogate Children born in India and Thailand will reduce following the recent criminalisation of International 
Surrogacy Arrangements in these jurisdictions. 
49 There does not seem to be significant state practice or opinio juris to the effect that Article 4 represents 
customary international law. Therefore Article 4 is only binding on States Parties to the CRS. 
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accountable for denial of nationality and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
- which has a mandate for the assistance of stateless persons since 1974 - does not have a 
mandate to declare the denial of nationality illegal.50 
In light of the abovementioned problems, it is necessary to determine whether there are other 
provisions of Public International Law that would protect international surrogate children who 
are born stateless. Article 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) (ICCPR) stipulates a child’s right to be registered after birth and to acquire a 
nationality.51 The ICCPR has significantly more State Parties than the CRS - 168 at the time of 
writing - yet similar to Article 15 of the UDHR, Article 24 of the ICCPR does not identify 
which state is obliged to grant nationality, nor under what circumstances nationality should be 
granted. In addition, in General Comment 17, the Human Rights Committee stated that Article 
24(3) ‘does not necessarily make it an obligation for States to give their nationality to every 
child born in their territory.’52 Accordingly, the right in Article 24 is not to be considered a right 
of the individual, but was accorded by the state at its discretion.53 However, the Human Rights 
Committee has urged states to enforce Article 24(3) in a meaningful manner, for example, in 
its comments on Ecuador, Colombia, and Zimbabwe.54  
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’) is the most widely-ratified international 
treaty.55 The CRC deals with the rights of children generally and not stateless children 
                                                          
50 UNGA Res 3274 [XXIX] [10 December 1974]; UNGA Res 31/36 [30 November 1976]. 
51 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171. 
5252 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 17: Rights of the Child (At 24): 
07/04/89, [8]. During the course of drafting, the original proposal of Article 24(3) provided that ‘The child shall 
be entitled from his birth to … a nationality.’ During the ensuing debate, the word ‘acquire’ was inserted and the 
words ‘from his birth’ were deleted. According to Detrick, these amendments were made because the majority felt 
that a state could not assume an unqualified obligation to afford its nationality to every child born on its territory 
regardless of the circumstances. 
53 Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
1999), 150.  
54 (1998) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.92; (1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 76; (1998) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 
89. 
55 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3. The USA and Somalia are the only UN members 
that are not States Parties to the CRC. 
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specifically, but six provisions (Art. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10) within the CRC are nonetheless relevant 
to stateless children born by international surrogacy agreements.56 The first, most important, 
aspect of the CRC is its applicability. Article 2 sets out that States Parties only have an 
obligation towards children within their jurisdiction.57 However, this does not mean that the 
CRC does not have extra-territorial application. The drafting history of the CRC reveals that 
the original proposal of Article 2 referred to ‘all children in their territories’ and thus the 
replacement of this terminology strongly indicates that the CRC does not apply exclusively on 
a territorial basis.58 Many of the provisions in the CRC have international aspects, such as those 
dealing with custody and access (Article 10), adoption (Article 21), and refugees (Article 22).59 
More generally, there is significant international jurisprudence indicating that a treaty can be 
applicable where a state acts extra-territorially.60  
Article 3 provides that in all actions concerning children, the ‘best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration.’ Such actions would of course include applications on behalf of a child 
for the granting of nationality. More specific to the problem identified by this article, Article 7 
provides that: 
‘The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from 
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
                                                          
56 Douglas Hodgson, ‘The International Legal Protection of the Child’s Right to a Legal Identity and the Problem 
of Statelessness’, 7 International Journal of Law and the Family 255 (1997); Jaap E. Doek, ‘The CRC and the 
Right to Acquire and to Preserve a Nationality’ 25(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 26 (2006). 
57 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3, Article 2; Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 1999), 69. 
58 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1349, p. 3. 
59 Detrick, 71. 
60 See, for example, Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, application no. 27021/08, 7 July 2011; Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v. Italy, application no. 27765/09, 23 February 2012. 
19 
 
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with 
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments 
in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.’ 
Read in conjunction with Article 2 (which provides that it is the state in whose jurisdiction the 
child is has the obligation to implement the CRC), the obligation in Article 7 is thus primarily 
addressed to the state in which the child is born. However, as the right is ‘to acquire’ a 
nationality, the same considerations regarding Article 24 of the ICCPR apply, that is, that there 
may be an element of state discretion involved in the bestowal of nationality. It is difficult to 
reconcile this with the words ‘shall ensure’ in the second part of Article 3, which entail an 
obligation of result.61 This means that the state in which the child is born must successfully 
implement the right to acquire a nationality. The CRC does not specifically say the nationality 
granted should be the nationality of that state specifically; however we argue that in line with 
the object and purpose of the treaty (which is to protect the rights of the child),62 and the 
principle of effectiveness,63 that the State Party in which the child is born has at the very least 
an obligation to grant nationality where the child would otherwise be rendered stateless.  
In addition, Article 8 of the CRC provides that the State Party has a continuing obligation to 
preserve the child’s identity, which includes their nationality, name, and family relations and 
Article 9 provides that as a general rule, a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will. Thus where a child is awaiting determination of nationality, it can be argued 
that the state has an obligation not to expel his or her parent(s). This is supported by Article 10, 
which provides that applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party 
for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with in a positive, humane and expeditious 
                                                          
61 Detrick, 68-69. 
62 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Article 31(1). 
63 This principle provides that the objective of treaty interpretation is to advance the aims of that treaty. See Richard 
K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2008), 190. 
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manner; and Article 3, which provides that the best interests of the child are paramount. Clearly, 
being accompanied by their intended parents in the best interests of a newborn child. However, 
similar to the CRS, the term ‘parent’ is undefined by the CRC.  
Finally, it should be noted that Optional Protocol III to the CRC, which provides for an 
individual complaints mechanism,64 entered into force in April 2014.65 It currently has 26 States 
Parties, although the Committee has yet to deliver its views on any complaint received.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly refer to nationality 
rights.66 However, Article 8(1) provides that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life’. The relationship between this article and international surrogacy agreements 
was examined in the recent cases of Labassee v. France and Menneson v. France.67 Both cases 
concerned a husband and wife who conducted surrogacy arrangements in the USA using the 
gametes of the husband and an egg from the surrogate. The cases examined the refusal of the 
French authorities to legally recognise the family tie between a child, his biological father, and 
his intended mother; and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that the 
proceedings should be considered simultaneously.68 In its judgment, the ECtHR said that a 
distinction was to be drawn between: (i) the applicants’ right to respect for their family life; and 
(ii) the right of the children to respect for their private life. Regarding point (i), the ECtHR 
decided that because the children were not prevented from living in France and because of the 
                                                          
64 States can also submit a declaration pursuant to Article 12 that they recognise the competence of the 
Committee to receive inter-state complaints. 
65 General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of a Child on a Communications 
Procedure, 19 December 2011. 
66 1955 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 221. 
67 Mennesson v France, application no. 65192/11, 26 June 2014; Labassee v France, application no. 65941/11, 
26 June 2014. See Gregor Puppinck and Claire de La Hogue, ‘ECHR : Towards the Liberarisation of Surrogacy’, 
English translation of an original study published in French in (2004) 118 Revue Lamy de Droit Civil 78. 
68 The child in question was not stateless, however the concept of a ‘family link’ may be relevant in future cases 
where such a link must be established for the purposes of granting nationality. 
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doctrine of margin of appreciation,69 a fair balance had been struck between the interests of the 
parents and those of the state. Regarding point (ii), the ECtHR said that although the ECHR 
does not grant a right to nationality, nationality is an element of a person’s identity and it has 
consequences for the enjoyment of other rights, in particular for inheritance rights. The ECtHR 
accepted that France may wish to deter its nationals from going abroad to undertake surrogacy 
agreements, but the effects of non-recognition of the children’s relationship with a parent affects 
the children, whose right to private life was substantially affected. The ECtHR therefore held 
in both cases that France’s refusal to legally recognise both families constituted a violation of 
right to private life under Article 8 ECHR.  
To draw this decision back to the question posed in this article, it appears that the ECtHR was 
willing to interpret Article 8 of the Convention broadly to find an obligation to recognise a 
family link between the intended mother, biological father, and a child born outside a 
Contracting State by an international surrogacy agreement. In future cases, this decision may 
be relevant for establishing nationality, particularly given the reference in the case to nationality 
forming part of a person’s identity. Indeed, there is some evidence of the influence of this 
reasoning in recent domestic cases relating to surrogacy especially in states which previously 
adopted a restrictive approach.70 The HCCH has stated that Mennesson and Labasse has had an 
impact, and argue that a trend can, albeit cautiously, be discerned in recent cases in favour of 
the broader recognition of legal parentage following international surrogacy agreements under 
certain conditions.71 However, a notable feature of Mennesson and Labasse was that these 
children were present on French territory, which triggered France’s obligation in this regard. 
                                                          
69 This refers to space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities, in fulfilling 
their obligations under the ECtHR. 
70 See generally, Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘The Parantage/Surrogacy Project: An Updating 
Note’ (February, 2015) available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2015pd03a_en.pdf  8. 
71 Ibid, 8. See, the German Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 10 December 2014 (No. XII ZB 463/13) which held in 
favour for the recognition in Germany of a California judgment recognising two intending fathers as the parents 
of a child born through surrogacy;  
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Had the children concerned never entered France, the ECHR would not apply. This is because 
Article 1 ECHR provides that it will only apply to persons within the jurisdiction of the States 
Parties,72 and it is only in exceptional circumstances that a decision of a state that has extra-
territorial effects can be held as a violation of the ECHR.73 Thus in order for Article 8 – and by 
extension, the above case-law – to be applicable, the child concerned would need to be present 
in Council of Europe member state to rely on the ECHR.74 As aforementioned, one of the first 
problems a stateless child often faces is entering the state of his intended parents, thus it is 
unclear how much assistance this case will give in practical terms as ipso facto, children born 
by virtue of international surrogacy agreements are born outside of the state of nationality 
and/or residence of their intended parents. 
The decisions of Labassee and Mennesson were followed by the decision of Paradiso and 
Campanelli v Italy in 2015.75 In this case, Italy refused to transcribe the birth certificate of a 
child born to a surrogate in Russia. When it emerged that the intended father had no genetic 
link with the child (contrary to the information that the intended parents had provided the 
authorities), the applicants were charged with distorting the civil state, forging, and violating 
the law on adoption. The child was subsequently placed in care and the applicants were found 
to no longer have standing in the adoption proceedings. 
The ECtHR ruled that the applicants could not act on behalf of the child, who had a guardian 
since October 2011. However, the ECtHR held that the decision to separate the child from the 
intended parents amounted to a violation of the parents’ right to family life as protected by 
Article 8 of the ECHR, as the child had been with the couple for six months and thus there 
                                                          
72 ‘Jurisdiction’ may also include acts carried out extra-territorially, but this is not relevant in the context of this 
paper. 
73 See, for example, Soering v United Kingdom, application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
74 The ECHR may nevertheless provide protection to children born in the Ukraine and Russia, where many ISAs 
are carried out. 
75 Paradiso et Campanelli c. Italie, application no. 25358/12, 27 January 2015. 
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existed a de facto family environment. The focus of the case was therefore on the removal 
aspect, as the ECtHR found that the claim regarding the transcription was inadmissible on 
account of the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies.  
This judgment is of significance for stateless children born from international surrogacy 
agreements for the following reasons. First, in recognising that a de facto family environment 
was created despite: (i) a surrogacy contract which would be illegal in Italy; (ii) false statements 
being made in respect of parentage; and (iii) no genetic link between the intended parents and 
the child; the ECtHR has significantly broadened the decisions in Labassee and Mennesson. In 
this sense, the ECtHR does not address questions of public policy (i.e. the desirability of 
surrogacy) or morality of the actions of the intended parents when determining whether a family 
relationship exists for the purposes of Article 8. The ECtHR focuses only on the 
child’s/intended parents’ rights to private and family life, concentrating on the de facto links 
between the intended parents and the child.  To apply this by analogy to stateless children born 
from international surrogacy agreements, it could be argued that this decision has made it easier 
for intended parents to show the necessary link to a stateless child for the purposes of applying 
for nationality. In the words of Judges Raimondi and Spano, in their Separate Opinion: 
‘[…] the position of the majority essentially denies the legitimate choice of states 
to not recognise the effects of surrogacy arrangements. If creating an illegal link 
with a child abroad is sufficient to create a ‘family life’, it is clear that the freedom 
of states to not recognise the legal effects of surrogacy agreements, a freedom 
previously recognised in the jurisprudence of this Court, is reduced to 
nothingness.’76 
                                                          
76 [15]. This is the authors’ translation from the French judgment  
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Secondly, it may be recalled that in Labassee and Mennesson, the Court was unwilling to find 
that the parents’ Article 8 rights had been violated. By finding that the parents’ Article 8 rights 
had been violated, the Paradiso decision has broadened the scope of Article 8 in relation to 
international surrogacy agreements. The result is that the ECtHR has taken a purposive 
approach to Article 8 which is in line with the approach put forward by this article. Put simply, 
although the banning surrogacy is a prerogative of the state, the human rights of the child and 
of the parents is a separate human rights issue that is protected by the ECHR. 
Finally, although the decision in Paradiso recalled that the ECHR needs to be interpreted in 
accordance with the principles of international law, it is regrettable that the discussion of 
international law principles was limited to a brief mention of the 1961 Hague Convention 
Eliminating the Requirement of Legalisation of Foreign Public Documents. Many of the 
conventions discussed in the previous section also contain provisions that are particularly 
relevant to the facts in Paradiso. By analogy, in future ECtHR cases involving statelessness the 
ECtHR should follow the logic of its position and take into account all the provisions discussed 
in this article in its interpretation of the ECHR. 
 
5. Is a New Convention the Best Solution? 
Most of the literature to date on international surrogacy agreements identify the problems that 
arise by virtue of these agreements and generally agrees with the position of the HCCH that a 
new convention regulating international surrogacy agreements is necessary.77 However, a new 
convention will simply not solve the problems outlined by this article. Intended parents usually 
                                                          
77 Yasmine Ergas, ‘Babies without Borders: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and the Regulation of International 
Commercial Surrogacy’ (2013) 27 Emory International Law Review 117; Katarina Trimmings and Paul 
Beaumount, ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An urgent need for Legal Regulation at the International 
Leve’ 7 Journal of Private International Law 627; Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumount (eds.) International 
Surrogacy Agreements. Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
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participate in international surrogacy agreements because commercial surrogacy is illegal in 
their own national jurisdiction. Therefore states that have banned commercial surrogacy would 
have to ratify such a convention in order for it to be successful, i.e. so that the state of the 
intended parents would be obliged to grant nationality to international surrogate children. We 
argue that that simply is not going to happen. Even if states are willing to participate in the 
convention, it could years for the convention to enter into force. This was the case for the 1990 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families,78 which only entered into force twelve years after its initial adoption by the General 
Assembly,79 and has been ratified by only 49 states.  
Second, the negotiation of a new convention could take years, if not decades. Negotiation on 
the proposed convention has not yet begun, as the HCCH is still in the very early stages of 
preliminary research. Third, there is no guarantee that a convention will ever be completed. The 
discussion of statelessness and nationality in this article is but one of many controversial issues 
on which the drafters of the Convention will have to find agreement. As any new Convention 
would necessitate the drafting of a framework for legal parentage in the Convention, negotiating 
what this would entail would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the context 
of how international surrogacy agreements operate, and particularly, the reasons why surrogates 
participate in such agreements occur in ‘highly differentiated localities’80 throughout the world 
where practices/motivations vary significantly. For instance, in India, ethnographic studies have 
demonstrated that many of those who act as egg donors and surrogates do so in order to relieve 
                                                          
78 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, Res. A/RES/45/158, 18 December 1990. 
79 Migrant Workers Need Protection: UN Treaty Comes into Force’, Human Rights Watch, Press Release, 30 June 
2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/06/30/migrant-workers-need-protection. 
80 Bronwyn Parry, ‘Narratives of neoliberalism: ‘clinical labour’ in context’ (2015) 14 Medical Humanities 32, 
34, 37. See also: Luna Dolezal, ‘Considering Pregnancy in commercial surrogacy : a response to Bronwyn 
Parry’ (2015) 41(1) Medical Humanities 38.  
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permanent or temporary indebtedness,81 and this may differ significantly from motivations of 
surrogates in states such as the US. Moreover, significant differences and inequalities may exist 
in terms of intended parents and surrogates involved in international surrogacy agreements.82 
Any attempt to achieve a global consensus on the regulation of surrogacy, such as in the form 
of an international convention ‘must necessarily be informed by detailed ethnographic research 
that elucidates the complex lived experience of clinical labour in situ’ 83  and would need to ‘
attend to the question of how power relations within the neoliberal economy are shaped by 
longer histories of unevenness and geopolitical and social in equality’.84  Finally, no matter how 
comprehensive the negotiation process is, there will inevitably be cases that will fall outside the 
parameters of the convention. For these reasons, we argue that a realistic approach should be 
taken as to when and if a convention will ever enter into force and it needs to be borne in mind 
that a convention will not prevent all instances of statelessness from surrogacy arising.  
In the meantime, it is equally, if not more important to focus on existing binding provisions that 
regulate the bestowal of nationality for children born stateless pursuant to international 
surrogacy agreements. This is because states cannot use provisions of its domestic laws as an 
excuse for failing to carry out its international treaty obligations.85 The CRC, which is the most 
widely-ratified international treaty, offers the most comprehensive protection in this respect, 
particularly when the provisions on nationality and the principle of the ‘best interests of the 
child’ are read in conjunction with each other. Moreover, increasing the number of States 
                                                          
81 Bronwyn Parry, ibid, 34, who also cites: M Cooper,C Waldby, Clinical labor: tissue donors and research 
subjects in the global bioeconomy (Duke University Press, 2014); L Boltanski E Chiapello, The new spirit of 
capitalism (Verso, 2005). 
82 For example, see, A Pande, ‘Transnational commercial surrogacy in India: gifts for global sisters?’ (2011) 
23(5) Reprod Biomed Online 618-625; A Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in 
India (Columbia University Press, 2014) 
83 Parry, note 86, 37 
84 Parry, note 86, 37 
85 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Article 27  
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Parties to the CRS will have a direct impact on reducing statelessness, as states usually 
undertake accession in addition to other measures aimed at reducing statelessness, such as 
reforming nationality laws, conducting surveys of stateless populations and creating 
statelessness determination procedures. In addition, encouraging accession can involve 
engagement with a wide range of stakeholders at the national level, including politicians, 
government officials, community organizations and civil society groups.86 Such engagement 
provides an ideal opportunity to lobby for change on behalf of children born stateless as a result 
of international surrogacy agreements. 
Moreover, it is notable that following the successful outcomes of Paradiso, Mennesson, and 
Labassee, a number of cases are pending before the ECtHR. This includes Laborie et autres c. 
France (concerning the refusal of the French authorities to transcribe Ukrainian birth 
certificates of children born through international surrogacy agreements);87 Foulon c. France,88 
and Bouvet et autres c. France (both cases concerning the refusal of the French authorities to 
transcribe Indian birth certificates of children born through international surrogacy 
agreements.)89 Given the broad approach that the Court took in Paradiso, it is likely that the 
ECtHR will find a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR in the above cases. It remains to be seen 
whether the ECtHR will use the principles of Public International Law as highlighted in this 
article to inform its rulings. 
We also argue that lawyers should be encouraged to make Public International Law arguments 
in domestic cases, while being mindful of the limits of those arguments as outlined above. For 
states such as the Netherlands that have a monist legal system, international law is directly 
applicable in the domestic legal system and thus the arguments canvassed in this article are 
                                                          
86 UNHCR, ‘Good Practices Paper: Acceding to the UN Statelessness Conventions’ (2014). 
87 Laborie c. France, application no. 44024/13, 16 January 2015. 
88 Foulon c. France, application no. 9063/14, 24 January 2014. 
89 Bouvet c. France, application no. 10410/14, 29 January 2014. 
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similarly directly applicable in a domestic court.90 For states such as the United Kingdom that 
operate a dualist legal system, the national legislature must ‘transform’ the international 
obligation into a rule of national law, and the national judge will then apply it as a rule of 
domestic law.91 However, a domestic judge should interpret that domestic rule in accordance 
with its original source as an international instrument. As was stated by Lord Hope of Craighead 
with reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention:92 
‘The point is commonly made in regard to the Convention that it is not right to 
construe its language with the same precision as one would if it had been an Act of 
Parliament. The Convention is an international instrument […] its choice of 
wording must be taken to have been the product of the inevitable process of 
negotiation and compromise […] And the general rule is that international treaties 
should, so far as possible, be construed uniformly by the national courts of all states. 
This point also suggests that the best guide to the meaning of the words used in the 
Convention is likely to be found by giving them a broad meaning in the light of the 
purposes which the Convention was designed to serve.’93 
Finally, we agree with the argument put forward by Ergas that the drafting of any new 
convention should be informed by existing human rights obligations.94 The ECJ held that 
human rights law limits Member States’ domestic conduct and the scope of their international 
agreements.95 Similarly, the ICJ has held that even where a particular lex specialis applies, its 
                                                          
90 Eileen Denza, ‘The Relationship between International and National Law’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), 
International Law, (OUP, 2nd Edition, 2006), 428. 
91 Eileen Denza, ‘The Relationship between International and National Law’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), 
International Law, (OUP, 2nd Edition, 2006), 429. 
92 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137. 
93 Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37. 
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95 Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-4015/05 P, Yassar Abdulla Kadi & Al Bakaraat International Foundation & 
Council of the European Union and EC Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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provisions are to be interpreted in view of human rights law,96 and human rights norms continue 
to apply unless they have been specifically suspended.97 Indeed, as aforementioned, the 
obligation to take into account international law was explicitly stated in the ECtHR decision of 
Campenelli, which dealt with the issue of international surrogacy agreements. Thus, it would 
in fact be a breach of international law for a state to carry out obligations under a new 
convention that conflicted with its existing human rights obligations and therefore the proposed 
convention would need to be in conformity with its existing obligations. We advocate in 
particular for the inclusion of those set out in the CRC as most states in the world are a party to 
that Convention. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
As identified above, the numbers of international surrogacy agreements are on the increase 
globally. With no international legal framework and significant disparities amongst national 
laws, children born as a result of international surrogacy agreements are in a precarious position. 
In such circumstances, as seen above, states have generally sought to achieve a temporary 
resolution but these solutions are often ad hoc in nature and can take considerable time and 
money to arrange.   
It is simply not satisfactory, given the general agreement internationally on the need to end 
statelessness, that children, who are one of the most vulnerable groups in society, and whose 
human rights and dignity must therefore be given the utmost legal protection, are born under 
the shadow of ‘statelessness’ with all the attendant risks this position entails. Although the 
                                                          
96 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226. 
97 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 ICJ 131.Although 
both the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory Opinions were dealing with the overlap between International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in situations of armed conflict, the principle is 
generalizable as such that International Human Rights Law will be applicable unless excluded by derogation or 
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proposed Hague Convention on Surrogacy, if completed, will address such issues, it is likely 
that it will take considerable time to conclude and that states that ban commercial surrogacy 
will be reluctant to participate. A better solution to the problems faced by international 
surrogacy agreement children is found in the provisions governing statelessness in Public 
International Law.  These provisions – particularly those contained in the CRC and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR– offer protection to international surrogacy agreement children and 
such provisions should be relied upon to interpret domestic legal provisions in litigation relating 
to international surrogacy agreements. Finally, the drafting of any new convention should be 
informed by existing international law obligations; particularly those set out in the CRC, which 
is the most widely-ratified treaty in the world. 
